Minimum Deterrence in Theory and Practise

This paper is not intended to create a straw man. It is a considered attempt to flesh out a concept to invite debate and which could, if twinned with bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations, produce lower levels of mutual deterrence for the nuclear weapons states and for the United States and Russia in particular. It could also induce greater confidence amongst the non-nuclear weapons states that Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is being taken seriously; a persistent charge levelled by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This could also have positive strategic benefits as well as reduce the economic costs of the stockpile of the world’s two nuclear superpowers. It will first make a case for lower levels of ‘minimum deterrence’ between the United States and Russia and put forward reasons for a gradual move to a single nuclear platform – the SSBN – alongside an arms control agenda that takes this into account.